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During the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September
2001, the disagreements between Western Europe and the United States over the death penalty have
become ever more pronounced. Despite the declaration of a “war” on terrorism by the United States,
[FN1] a number of European countries have announced that they will not extradite alleged terrorists if
the suspects are threatened by a death sentence. [FN2] In addition, they will not provide specific
intelligence information on defendants charged with the death penalty. [FN3]
In the long run these events may prove decisive for the future development of the death penalty in the
United States. In recent years, the United States has come under growing pressure, if not attack, by its
European allies over its use of the death penalty. In various fora--domestic, regional and international-Europeans have taken issue with the notion that death can ever be an appropriate sentence and with the
actual or threatened imposition of *132 capital punishment in individual cases. [FN4]
This Article provides a short historical overview of the death penalty abolitionist movement
(“abolitionist movement”) in various European states, and highlights how after largely parallel paths,
during the 1970s Europe and the United States parted ways. Next it discusses the various ways in which
individual European states, the European human rights machinery and the European Union (EU) have
indicated their disagreement and disenchantment with the United States over the issue of the death
penalty. Like segregation, the death penalty increasingly causes international problems for the United
States. It allows countries to charge the United States with human rights violations, isolates the United
States from European states, and symbolizes the American determination to interpret human rights so as
to accord with the U.S. Constitution and public opinion, rather than internationally recognized
principles. While most Americans remain unaware of the embarrassment the imposition of the death
penalty--especially when employed against juveniles and the mentally challenged--causes its diplomats
abroad and in international fora, the U.S. fight against terrorism will increasingly highlight the problems
the imposition of the death penalty constitutes in creating an international coalition and providing for
effective cross-border cooperation. Publicity of Europe’s opposition and refusal to cooperate in death
penalty cases arising from the “War Against Terrorism” might provide the necessary impetus to move
domestic institutions to restrict, and ultimately abolish, the death penalty, despite popular support for it.
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I Abolitionism in Europe and the United States
A. Parallelism
The modern abolitionist movement traces its origins to Italy’s criminologist Cesare Beccaria, who
argued for the abolition of the death penalty as inhumane in the late eighteenth century. [FN5] *133
Over the next few decades, the abolitionist movement took hold [FN6] even though the modern history
of the death penalty in Europe is as varied as in the individual states making up the United States. While
a few European states abolished capital punishment in the nineteenth century, [FN7] most did not take
this step until the second half of the twentieth century. [FN8] Certain groups of individuals- juveniles
and pregnant women-however, came to be exempted from execution much earlier. [FN9] In addition,
the number of death-eligible offenses declined during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in all
European countries. [FN10] The time in which no execution occurred also lengthened in numerous
European countries. This was particularly important since de jure abolition often lagged behind de facto
abolition. [FN11] However, newly emerging criminological theories and fascist regimes reversed the
abolitionist trend in Europe which existed prior to World War I. [FN12]
During World War II, the number of executions surged on all sides, often after long execution-free
periods. In its aftermath, the Nuremberg trials led to the hanging of numerous individuals implicated in
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. [FN13] War criminals were also executed following domestic
prosecutions in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. [FN14]
After this dramatic upsurge in executions, further imposition of the death penalty declined
substantially. Over popular opinion, *134 Germany, in its Basic Law of 1949, abolished capital
punishment. [FN15] While an abolitionist attitude developed in some European states in the 1950s, in
others this did not occur until the late 1960s and 1970s. Even though some European countries
continued executions throughout the 1950s and 1960s, by the end of that decade, most of them stopped
executions de facto. [FN16] By 1970, five European countries--Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland-- were de facto, but not yet de jure, abolitionist. While the population in most
European countries continued to support the death penalty throughout these decades, [FN17] the
political elites argued for, and ultimately accomplished, first a de facto and finally a de jure ban on
executions. [FN18] It was not until the last decade of the twentieth century that the majority of the
population in at least some European countries became abolitionist. [FN19]
The development in the United States during much of this time runs largely parallel to the events in
Europe. The Michigan Territory abolished the death penalty, with the exception of punishment for
treason, in 1846. [FN20] By 1929, sixteen states had abolished capital punishment, [FN21] with many
of them acting during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. [FN22] Between the two world
wars, however, the death penalty experienced a short resurgence. [FN23] Nevertheless, by the 1960s it
had become increasingly *135 a regional phenomenon, primarily focused on the southern states. [FN24]
Even states that permitted capital punishment, however, grew ever more reluctant to execute. In 1966,
only one person was executed; in 1968 and 1969, no executions occurred. [FN25] With the Supreme
Court’s de facto moratorium imposed in Furman v. Georgia, [FN26] it appeared at the time as if the
abolitionist development would take the same course in the United States as in Europe. Because of the
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small number of executions annually during the late 1960s, a judicially-imposed moratorium appeared to
foreshadow the ultimate demise of capital punishment. [FN27] While this held true for European
countries, it did not for the United States. [FN28]
B. Parting Ways
Opposition to the Supreme Court’s Furman decision developed immediately, and the state legislatures
whose statutes had been invalidated began to draw up new punishment regimes that would allow for the
imposition of the death penalty under the Furman framework. [FN29] With the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gregg v. Georgia, [FN30] which declared the revised state death penalty statutes
constitutional, executions in the United States resumed; and the death row population has increased
dramatically since the late 1970s. [FN31]
*136 During the late 1980s and the 1990s, an increasing number of states, including some that had long
been abolitionist de jure, reinstituted the death penalty. [FN32] Moreover, congressional legislation
reinvigorated the federal death penalty starting in the late 1980s, and substantially expanded its reach
with the 1994 Federal Death Penalty Act. [FN33] The first federal execution in almost forty years
occurred in the summer of 2001, when Timothy McVeigh was sent to death for his involvement in the
Oklahoma City bombing. [FN34] Even though federal death row is very small, compared to the number
of individuals awaiting execution by the states, [FN35] its existence carries substantial symbolic
meaning.
As of 2002, about 3700 individuals are on death row, with 540 having been executed between 1991
and 2000. [FN36] A number of them are citizens of Spain, England, Germany, France, and other
European countries. [FN37]
The divergence in attitudes and practices between the United States and European countries that began
in the early to mid-1970s parallels developments in a host of other criminal justice areas, including the
imposition of incarcerative sentences and collateral sanctions. [FN38] While the United States
expanded its use of the death penalty starting in the late 1970s, shortly thereafter the European countries
began to institutionalize abolition of the death penalty. The European Convention on Human Rights,
*137 which entered into force in 1953, [FN39] still allows for capital punishment as an exception to the
right to life, [FN40] but the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention-opened for signature in 1983captures the abolitionist spirit. [FN41] The Protocol outlaws death sentences generally, but narrowly
allows countries to retain capital punishment “in time of war or imminent threat of war.”[FN42] In that
situation, executions become analogized to the killing of enemy soldiers on the battlefield, while there
seems little connection to the execution of offenders in the criminal arena. The exception can therefore
be explained by the fact that capital sentences in war are viewed as part of the war effort rather than as a
tool of the criminal justice process. [FN43] Capital punishment in times of war is tied more closely to
the existence and survival of the state and state sovereignty than in times of peace.
Since the Sixth Protocol has been opened for ratification, states applying for membership to the
Council of Europe have been expected to sign it prior to admission. [FN44] While those countries that
were already member-states of the Council of Europe were not under the same pressure, [FN45] no
executions have occurred in those states. [FN46]
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Turkey’s imposition of the death penalty on Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdish independence
movement and convicted terrorist, has caused widespread public and diplomatic protest in *138 the
other Council of Europe member-states. [FN47] Because of their extensive diplomatic threats against
Turkey, it complied with the stay of execution issued while Öcalan’s case is being heard before the
European Court of Human Rights, and agreed to lift the death penalty even for terrorism crimes. [FN48]
The European response to the Öcalan case is indicative of the pressure the member-states of the Council
of Europe and the European Union have exerted on other member-states and applicant states with regard
to the death penalty. [FN49]
In February 2002, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe took the final step on the road
to abolition. It signed the Thirteenth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, which
completes the mission of the Sixth Protocol by abolishing the death penalty even in times of war and
serious national emergencies. [FN50] This development, following on the heels of the U.S.
administration’s declaration of a “war on terrorism,” indicates how serious the Council member states
are about abolishing the death penalty entirely. Even though popular support for the death penalty may
continue in many European countries, the present regional legal regime makes it impossible for Council
of Europe member-states to re-introduce the death penalty without violating the European Convention
and its *139 Protocols. [FN51]
The death penalty has become a growing issue of contention between Europe and the United States.
Among the leading and most vocal countries opposing capital punishment are the former fascist nations
of Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. [FN52] In recent years, they have developed a panoply
of responses to U.S. executions.
II European Pressure
In recent years, European countries--acting individually and in a wide variety of domestic, regional,
and international fora--have strongly criticized the United States on its use of the death penalty. They
have attempted to exert pressure in individual death cases and have publicly embarrassed the United
States. [FN53]
While the United States is not the only target of European pressure, [FN54] because of its international
stature, its use of the death penalty has attracted particular censure. For Europeans to *140 succeed in
their ultimate goal of a world-wide ban on capital punishment, they will need U.S. support. [FN55]
A. Actions within International and Regional Human Rights Bodies
The European countries have taken a variety of measures within the European Union and the Council
of Europe to prevent continued imposition of the death penalty in the United States. Among their
actions are a powerful information campaign against the death penalty, the financing of amicus briefs in
U.S. courts, and relentless diplomatic efforts. [FN56]
There appears to be universal agreement that pregnant women and mothers of very young children
should not be executed [FN57] and that the death penalty should be imposed only for the most serious
offenses. [FN58] The United States, however, has resisted the increasing international consensus
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against the execution of juveniles--those who commit offenses while they are under eighteen years old,
[FN59] a group for whose exemption the European countries work particularly. Until the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Atkins v. Virginia, [FN60] the United States also permitted *141 executions
of mentally retarded offenders. Much of the legal activity within the European countries has been aimed
at cases in which juveniles and the mentally impaired are threatened with execution. [FN61] For that
reason, European countries will consider Atkins a victory, indicative of the impact their campaign has
had. [FN62] While not determinative, the Court did refer to the opinion of the “world community” in its
opinion, and cited to the European Union’s amicus brief in McCarver. [FN63]
In their opposition to the death penalty, the European countries also support other regional bodies.
European parliament resolutions, for example, have urged the United States to follow determinations
and requests by the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights. [FN64] However, the Council of
Europe recently took its most decisive direct diplomatic action in opposing capital punishment in the
United States and Japan. It threatened both countries with suspending their observer status if no changes
toward abolition occur by January 1, 2003. [FN65]
1. Actions within the United Nations
In 1994, the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which prohibits “torture or . . . cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” [FN66]
However, the United States entered a reservation to this provision, *142 indicating that it interprets it
identical to the Due Process Clauses and the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. [FN67]
Eleven European countries objected to this reservation, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which
evaluates state compliance with the ICCPR, found it incompatible with the Convention. [FN68] The
United States, however, did not withdraw it. On the contrary, legislation was introduced in the U.S.
Senate that opposed the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s criticism of the United States. [FN69] The
European Parliament has implicitly rejected the reservation, and has urged the U.S. Supreme Court to
force the United States into compliance with the ICCPR. [FN70]
While international human rights norms have not yet developed a consensus regarding the abolition of
the death penalty, within the United Nations the European states continue to urge moratoria with the
ultimate goal of abolition. Every year the European countries have pressed for a moratorium at the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights. [FN71] The General Assembly has *143 also seen resolutions on the
abolition of the death penalty, introduced by the European Union, but has not adopted any yet. [FN72]
Empowered by its European and Latin American member states, the United Nations committees have
taken a more forceful stand against the death penalty. Since 1997, the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights has called annually for a moratorium on death sentences. [FN73] Despite a goal of total
abolition, the Commission has focused on “[p]rogressively . . . restrict[ing] the number of offences for
which the death penalty may be imposed.” [FN74] The initial aims are to stop the execution of pregnant
women, juvenile offenders, and the mentally ill. The resolutions also call on non-death states not to
extradite offenders who are threatened with the death penalty in the receiving state.
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2. Supranational Criminal Tribunals
In the supranational criminal tribunals following World War II, death sentences were imposed on a
number of offenders. [FN75] Even though the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes trials are frequently
held up as precedent in the development of international criminal law, [FN76] their use of the death
penalty has not continued in recently established tribunals. Neither the International Criminal Court for
Yugoslavia nor the Rwanda Tribunal allow for the imposition of capital punishment. [FN77] Moreover,
the newly established *144 International Criminal Court does not provide for death sentences. [FN78]
For all of these tribunals, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. [FN79]
In light of the strong preference of the United States for capital punishment, it seems surprising that the
United States has not attempted to include a death sanction in these international tribunals. [FN80]
After all, these courts have been designed to deal with the most serious of offenders. Aware of the
European and Latin American opposition to capital punishment, the United States has stood virtually
mute on the punishment provisions in the documents creating these tribunals. It has avoided direct
confrontation with its allies by accepting maximum life sentences. [FN81] This could be interpreted as
acquiescence to the international abolitionist movement, and silent recognition, at least on part of the
U.S. government, that the death penalty is no longer defensible internationally.
Advocacy within and through international and regional tribunals is only one aspect of Europe’s
campaign against the death penalty. Europe’s anti-capital punishment work has had the most impact in
areas where it has directly affected U.S. prosecutions and policies.
B. The European Court of Human Rights: Extradition
One of the most celebrated cases in the death penalty arena is the 1989 decision by the European Court
of Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom. [FN82] This case did not present the Court with a
direct challenge to the death penalty. Instead, Soering, a citizen of Germany, claimed that his requested
extradition from the United Kingdom to the state of Virginia would violate *145 his rights under Article
3 of the Convention, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, because of the socalled “death- row phenomenon.” The Court agreed. It found that during the extended time period
between imposition of a death sentence and its execution, which averaged six to eight years in Virginia,
the condemned person was subjected to severe and increasing anguish and stress, and suffered inhumane
conditions while being held on death row. Therefore, Soering could not be extradited to the United
States as long as he was threatened by the death penalty. [FN83]
Based on Soering, European states have refused extradition of fugitives to the United States unless they
get explicit assurances that these individuals will not be subjected to capital trials. [FN84] Italy and
Portugal go yet a step further; they refuse extradition to any retentionist country. [FN85]
The Soering decision did not only have a direct impact on extradition to the United States and other
retentionist countries. It also provided other tribunals with a powerful rationale to attack at least the
circumstances surrounding executions, albeit not capital *146 punishment itself. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, for example, cited the Soering decision in its line of cases striking
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down individual death sentences. [FN86] Justice Breyer also referred to Soering in two dissents from
denials of certiorari. [FN87]
Even though the Soering decision has not affected the jurisprudence of U.S. courts, it has had an
impact on law-enforcement practices. Extraditions from European countries can only be expected if the
state or federal government requesting the extradition provides assurances that it will not seek the death
penalty. [FN88] While this policy has been in place for over a decade, it came to the attention of the
U.S. public in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, when a number of European countries,
including Spain and France, announced that they would not extradite suspected members of the terrorist
organization Al-Qaeda unless they received assurances by the U.S. government that it would not ask for
the death penalty in their trials. [FN89]
*147 Other forms of international cooperation in criminal and terrorist investigations might also be
impacted by U.S. requests for the death penalty. Prior to a decision by the U.S. Department of Justice on
whether to ask for a capital sentence in the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui, a French citizen charged with
involvement in the attacks of September 11, 2001, the French government asked the United States not to
demand the death penalty. [FN90] When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the decision to
proceed with a death request, the French administration immediately denounced it and declared that it
would no longer share intelligence information that would assist the federal government in the
prosecution of Moussaoui. [FN91] The existing cooperation agreement between France and the United
States allows France to stop the exchange of information in death penalty cases. [FN92]
In other cases, European countries have attempted to prevent the execution of their citizens directly,
albeit with little success.
C. The International Court of Justice: Consular Notification
The imposition of the death penalty on foreign citizens has led to the United States being sued in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) twice in the last five years. [FN93] In both cases, the countries
representing their citizens--Paraguay and Germany--accused the United States of violating the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, [FN94] under which the United States is obligated *148 to inform
foreign consuls of arrests and indictments issued against their citizens. [FN95]
The case brought by Germany involved two German citizens, Walter and Karl LaGrand, who had been
sentenced to death in Arizona. The ICJ issued a temporary injunction to prevent the execution of Walter
LaGrand. [FN96] Germany had requested that the ICJ stay the execution after diplomatic attempts at
settling the case had failed. In its intermediate ruling, the ICJ explicitly asked the United States to
assure that Arizona comply with the United States’ international obligations. [FN97] Nevertheless,
Arizona executed Walter LaGrand. [FN98]
Domestically, the federal government sent mixed messages to the state of Arizona. [FN99] While the
federal government opposed a stay at the ICJ, upon the ICJ’s ruling it reluctantly asked the governor to
postpone the execution. Most disturbingly, however, it opposed a stay at the Supreme Court level,
which could have legally bound Arizona not to proceed with the execution. [FN100]
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The United States has been frequently criticized for its actions in LaGrand, [FN101] including by the
ICJ. [FN102] Even though this is not *149 the first time that the United States has failed to comply with
international obligations, [FN103] its action in LaGrand indicates how the federal government is
inclined to allow individual states that do not seem concerned about international norms [FN104] to
flout the decisions of a supranational tribunal and violate the international obligations of the United
States with impunity. Pro-death penalty attitudes on the federal level and state sovereignty concerns
ultimately trumped compliance with the consular convention and an ICJ order. [FN105]
Even though Germany did not style the LaGrand case as an attack on the death penalty, after the World
Court’s final ruling, in which the Court chastised the United States for its failure to adhere to the Vienna
Convention, German politicians expressed the hope that the decision would lead the United States to
reconsider its retentionist stance. [FN106] Recourse to the ICJ indicates the powerful feelings that the
Europeans hold with regard to the use of the death penalty by the United States. What explains their
abolitionist fervor?
*150 III In Search of a Motive
U.S. politicians and diplomats encounter European objections to the death penalty frequently and in
numerous fora. What drives the European agenda?
A. Public Pressure
Since all Western European countries from where the opposition to the death penalty emanates are
mature democracies, it is conceivable that much of their governmental opposition to the death penalty is
informed by popular opinion. However, over the years, opinion polls in many European countries
indicated that their populations continued to support the death penalty even after its abolition. [FN107]
In recent years, though, the margins have narrowed, and in some countries the majority of the population
now supports the government’s anti-death penalty stance. [FN108]
Opposition to the death penalty as carried out in the United States may be connected to this change in
European public opinion and the wide publicity executions in the United States receive on the other side
of the Atlantic. European newspapers regularly carry stories about pending executions. The most
publicity surrounds executions of individuals who belong to groups perceived as particularly vulnerable,
such as juveniles, women, and the mentally retarded, as well as European nationals. [FN109]
Much of the criticism of the death penalty in the United States is connected to other perceived
inequities in the U.S. criminal justice system. Frequently, racial disparities in the imposition and
execution of the death penalty are noted. Not surprisingly, Europeans also focus strongly on the class
component. Most death row inmates are poor. In a recent case involving a Spanish citizen who was
sentenced to death in Florida but acquitted upon re- trial, the Spanish media vociferously criticized the
cost of a good defense attorney and the general wealth disparities in the *151 U.S. criminal justice
system. [FN110] The case also served as a warning for possible miscarriages of justice. [FN111]
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Popular protests that occurred during recent visits of U.S. Presidents to Europe frequently centered
around the American use of the death penalty. Protesters have objected to its existence generally, and
particularly to what they perceive as its racially biased application.
A growing number of powerful anti-death penalty advocacy groups have also developed in Europe.
Among them are Amnesty International, which is headquartered in London, and the League of Human
Rights, which operates from Paris. [FN112]
Advocacy groups have often focused on individual cases which they consider to stand for particular
perversions of the U.S. criminal justice system and the death penalty. The case of Mumia Abu-Jamal
has been among those championed by European human rights activists, who have ultimately gotten the
European Parliament involved. [FN113]
As a member of the European Parliament noted, Abu-Jamal “stands out as a symbol” because he is
black and on death row, because he is an intellectual writer, and because of his militant activism.
[FN114] The speaker compared Abu-Jamal to Nelson Mandela and Alexander Solzhenitsyn. [FN115]
Such a comparison implies that Abu-Jamal’s death sentence is unjust because it is *152 based on racism
and political opinion rather than factual guilt. [FN116]
While popular opposition and advocacy groups may be able to exert certain pressure on governments,
recent diplomatic and legal efforts have been infused with a very powerful missionary fervor on the part
of many European governments.
B. The Death Penalty as a Human Rights Violation
While the current strategy of Europe’s governments has been to object to the imposition of the death
sentence in particularly egregious cases and to persuade the United States to join the growing
international consensus against the imposition of the death penalty against juveniles and the mentally
retarded, their overall goal is the abolition of the death penalty. [FN117] They have reached the
conclusion that the death penalty, under any circumstance, violates human rights norms. Its imposition
infringes on maturing norms which prevent the government from interfering with the preservation of
human life. At the same time, it does not fulfill any penological goals. [FN118]
Opposition to the U.S. embrace of the death penalty allows European countries to constitute themselves
as the defenders of human rights. The European Parliament, for example, characterizes abolition of
capital punishment as “a fundamental step towards enhancing human dignity, ongoing developing of
human rights and increasing respect for those rights.” [FN119] Such a position implies that the United
States has lost its status as the foremost human rights defender which it perceives itself to be.
Even though in the past the rationale of individual European governments for abolition may have
varied dramatically, [FN120] today abolition serves as a rallying cry for the moral superiority of the
*153 European states. [FN121] This may also be a reason why European people have become more
inclined to support abolitionism. Retention of the death penalty presents a dramatic showcase for
American backwardness and disregard for human and civil rights.
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This does not imply that merely political or strategic considerations motivate European opposition to
the death penalty. For the European countries, the death penalty symbolizes America’s lack of civility
and its unilateralism. The United States’ refusal to be bound by international agreements and to adhere
to decisions by international bodies merely appears to highlight America’s arrogance and its inability to
work towards a true international consensus in the human rights arena. Ultimately, European objections
to the death penalty challenge the United States’ moral leadership of democratic nations and its
commitment to civil and human rights.
How can and should the United States react to this development, assuming that it wants to preserve its
standing in the international human rights arena? [FN122]
IV Segregation and the Death Penalty: International Costs of Domestic Policies
The use of the death penalty, in general and especially against groups where a wide international
consensus has developed against their execution, creates a similar foreign policy embarrassment for the
United States as segregation did after World War II. In the early years of the Cold War, publicity about
the treatment of African Americans in the United States, and in the Southern states in particular,
severely damaged the United States in its attempts to portray its positions as enlightened, as compared
with those of the then Soviet Union. [FN123]
*154 News about the atrocious treatment of African Americans made headlines, not only in communist
countries, but also in nation-states allied with the United States. [FN124] Segregation inflicted a heavy
blow to the image of the United States abroad, in part because the communist nations exploited this
shortcoming. [FN125] The U.S. media were aware of this development. They widely documented the
impact segregation had on the battle of images conducted during the Cold War. [FN126]
This impact extended to the United Nations. During segregation, African Americans regularly brought
their plight to the attention of the General Assembly. In this way they could draw international attention
to the issue. [FN127] Similarly, today U.S. anti-death penalty organizations and death-row inmates
bring cases before the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
Foreign countries also exploit the death penalty issue. When the U.S. government has attacked their
human rights records, other countries have frequently retorted by focusing on the U.S. use of capital
punishment. Other retentionist countries have been critical of the United States, either because of its
more expansive use of executions, or because of what they perceive as a double standard. [FN128] For
abolitionist countries, the death penalty constitutes a dramatic indication of U.S. violation of human
rights norms. [FN129]
Despite these similarities in the international perception and exploitation of segregation and the death
penalty, there are dramatic differences in the domestic responses. While the Truman administration
acknowledged the former as a serious human rights issue, the U.S. government has defended its use of
the death penalty, in part through relying on strong public support at *155 home and arguing retention to
be a mandate of popular democracy. [FN130] During the Cold War, the State Department documented
the damage that segregation and the treatment of blacks--African Americans as well as foreign
dignitaries-- inflicted on the standing of the United States abroad. [FN131] It took it upon itself to
educate domestic agencies and departments about the impact segregation had on U.S. foreign policy.
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[FN132] Moreover, the Truman administration informed the U.S. Supreme Court, through amicus
briefs, about the negative implications of segregation on the development of U.S. foreign policy.
[FN133] Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education [FN134] constituted
a crucial symbol--at home and abroad--that the United States was committed to racial equality and that
the U.S. Constitution protected the American dream for all. [FN135]
Quite the contrary appears to be occurring in the death penalty context. Foreign critiques of the U.S.
application of the death penalty are generally disregarded. On his trip to Europe in June 2001, President
George W. Bush defended the use of the death penalty as a sovereign choice of the United States, based
on and supported by public opinion. [FN136] Attorney General John Ashcroft voiced the same theme in
his response to French criticism of the Department of Justice’s decision to seek the death penalty in the
case of Zacharias Moussaoui. [FN137]
In The Federal Republic of Germany v. The United States, [FN138] the United States went yet a step
further in its defense of the death penalty. In rejecting Germany’s demand for a stay of execution in the
case of Walter LaGrand, the Solicitor General argued that consideration of the ICJ’s stay order was
irrelevant to the legal case before the U.S. Supreme Court. [FN139] The Supreme Court’s ruling
denying a preliminary injunction and leave to file a *156 bill of complaint led to the execution of Walter
LaGrand, and the subsequent rebuke of the United States’ action by the ICJ. [FN140]
U.S. administrations do not appear to comprehend fully the damage American adherence to the death
penalty has caused to foreign relations and their standing in the world. While the executive branch’s
influence on state governments may be limited in the U.S. federal system, it could exert some persuasive
power and throw its support behind anti-death penalty positions in select court cases. [FN141] Had it
chosen to support Germany’s demand for a stay of execution, for example, it would have merely
vindicated rights under the Vienna Convention rather than espoused an abolitionist argument. However,
at this point, the federal government has not attempted to persuade the courts to narrow their position on
the death penalty in light of foreign policy and international human rights concerns.
In a number of death penalty cases involving the execution of mentally retarded individuals and
juveniles, former diplomats filed amicus briefs, indicating the problems such executions cause for the
development of U.S. foreign policy. They noted that “[i]n diplomatic settings, the United States faces
daily and growing criticism from the international community for maintaining a cruel and uncivilized
practice.” [FN142] They urged the Supreme Court not only to consider the growing international
consensus against such practices, but also their practical ramifications. The amici argued that continuing
the execution of mentally retarded individuals “would strain diplomatic relations with close American
allies, increasing America’s diplomatic isolation and impairing other United States foreign policy
interests.” [FN143] Despite their focus on the execution of the mentally retarded, all executions make
the conduct of foreign policy, at least in Europe, difficult. [FN144]
*157 V The Death Penalty in the “War on Terrorism”
While there are substantial differences between the fight against segregation and attempts to abolish the
death penalty, the United States’ use of capital punishment has become the symbol of a battle of images
that centers around human rights. European criticism of the death penalty is closely tied to a larger
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critique of other aspects of the U.S. criminal justice system, usually centering around the race and class
of criminal defendants [FN145] and the overall harshness of the existing punishment regime, which is
exemplified by chain gangs, life without parole, and three-strikes laws. [FN146] Anti- death penalty
advocacy from abroad is often intimately connected with a larger social justice critique that frequently
centers around disparities in American society. [FN147] Ultimately, the question of whether the United
States can be a legitimate protector of and advocate for human rights abroad when it fails to protect them
at home becomes distilled to the issue of whether a “civilized” country can employ the death penalty in
its criminal justice system. [FN148]
As the “War on Terrorism” is a global struggle, despite its military might, the United States will have
to rely on the cooperation of its allies, including European countries. [FN149] If this “war” takes *158
on the same importance and apocalyptic terms as the Cold War, domestic policies that constitute barriers
against more effective international cooperation may have to be scrutinized more carefully, as occurred
during the Cold War. [FN150] Depending on the ramifications of its decision to seek death sentences for
Zacharias Moussaoui and possibly others involved in the attacks of September 11, the United States may
have to consider seriously the special sensibilities of its European allies in the prosecution of their
citizens. [FN151] So far, however, the United States seems engaged in attempting to circumvent the
European restrictions on cooperation in cases where death sentences are threatened. [FN152]
Ultimately, however, failure of such attempts might lead to a more restricted use of the death penalty,
and possibly even motions towards abolition. [FN153] After all, European cooperation in terrorism
*159 prosecutions may be more crucial than the imposition of death sentences on individual defendants.
Many Europeans consider the United States’ use of the death penalty symbolic of its disregard of
international norms and an utter lack of concern for the interests and sensibilities of its allies. [FN154]
Therefore, gradual abolitionism may symbolize more than merely a retreat from capital punishment as a
sanction. It would reassert American (co-)leadership in the human rights arena and allow the United
States to reassert itself as an international player, rather than a unilateral power. [FN155] Therefore, the
importance of the death penalty extends far beyond its domestic meaning, and Europe’s fight against it
symbolizes a larger schism in the relationship between the Europeans and the United States.
[FNa1]. Visiting Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law; Professor of Law, St. Mary’s
University School of Law. Bates College, B.A., 1989; Yale Law School, J.D., 1992; Georgetown
University Law Center, LL.M., 1994. I would like to thank Eric Freedman, Stephen Mathias, Andreas
Paulus, Jeff Pokorak, Michael Smith, and Peter Spiro for their valuable input and suggestions. My
gratitude goes to the Morse Center at the University of Oregon School of Law for putting on the death
penalty symposium and to Barbara Aldave. I owe special thanks for excellent research assistance to
Patricia Kasting and my research assistant Antonetta Stancu (Hofstra 2003).
[FN1]. See, e.g., Lionel Barber, America’s War, Fin. Times, Sept. 14, 2001, at 22.
[FN2]. See, e.g., E.U. to Seek Global Extradition Agreement with U.S., Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb.
15, 2002; Elizabeth Bryant, Council of Europe Faults Terror Treatment, United Press Int’l, Jan. 24,
2002.
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[FN3]. See, e.g., Joel Blocker, France/U.S.: Criticism Tempered On Decision to Seek Death Penalty for
Moussaoui, Middle East News Online (Apr. 2, 2002), at
http://www.middleeastwire.com:8080/storypage.jsp?id=2457.
[FN4]. For an example of intervention by the European Union in a specific case, see Letter of the
European Union to Roy Barnes, the Governor of Georgia, on behalf of Tracy Housel, at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/HouselGAGovLett.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter Letter of the European Union].
[FN5]. William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law 4-5 (2d ed. 1997).
[FN6]. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
[FN7]. Portugal, for example, abolished the death penalty in 1867. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda 9 (1986). It was followed by the Netherlands
three years later. Schabas, supra note 5, at 6.
[FN8]. Peter Hodgkinson, The United Kingdom and the European Union, in Capital Punishment: Global
Issues and Prospects 193, 204-06 (Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996).
[FN9]. Schabas, supra note 5, at 19.
[FN10]. See, e.g., Christopher Hollis, The Homicide Act 9-10, 33 (1964) (describing decrease in
number of death eligible offenses and ultimate classification of homicides into those leading to death
and those allowing only for imprisonment); Michael L. Radelet, More Trends Toward Moratoria on
Executions, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 845, 845 (2001) (describing the situation in England).
[FN11]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 10.
[FN12]. Schabas, supra note 5, at 6.
[FN13]. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 609-10 (1992) (recounting the
executions of those convicted in Nuremberg); William A. Schabas, War Crimes, Crimes Against
Humanity and the Death Penalty, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 733, 737-40 (1997) [hereinafter War Crimes].
[FN14]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 9, 12.
[FN15]. Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 102 (F.R.G.), English translation available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm.
[FN16]. Hodgkinson, supra note 8, at 195, 205 (last executions in England occurred in 1964).
[FN17]. For some polling data from the 1990s, see id. at 8, at 196-97 (England), 204 (France), 205
(Denmark), 206 (Spain and Sweden). While in a few countries--England and France--popular support
for the death penalty continues to be strong, in others--Denmark and Sweden--it has largely abated.
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[FN18]. Id. at 205-06 (support for death penalty virtually non-existent among church bodies and the
legal and medical professions). For a critique of elite policy-making in this context, see John McAdams,
It’s Good, and We’re Going to Keep It: A Response to Ronald Tabak, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 819, 821-22
(2001).
[FN19]. Polling data in this area appears unreliable or at least subject to relatively quick change. See,
e.g., Hodgkinson, supra note 8, at 205-06 (providing data for Denmark and Sweden, with Spain’s
popular opinion equally divided); Thomas Sancton, A Matter of Life or Death, Time Atlantic, May 21,
2001, at 28 (indicating sixty percent disapproval rate for the death penalty in France and Italy).
[FN20]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 28.
[FN21]. Tom Wicker, Foreword, in Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at ix, x.
[FN22]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 29 tbl.2.1, at 29 (giving chronology of abolition in the
United States).
[FN23]. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement
in the United States, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (2002).
[FN24]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 30-33.
[FN25]. Id. at 26, 30 tbl.2.2.
[FN26]. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman rejected the state punishment regimes in place because of the
extraordinary discretion they allowed juries which caused arbitrary decisions. It did not declare death
sentences per se unconstitutional.
[FN27]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 37 (quoting U.S. commentators on the Furman decision);
Kirchmeier, supra note 23, at 15.
[FN28]. Numerous domestic anti-death penalty advocates continue to advocate for a moratorium on the
death penalty; others have argued that a moratorium will ultimately prolong the existence of capital
punishment. See, e.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 23, at 75-76 (judicially imposed moratorium almost
destroyed the anti-death penalty movement in the 1970s), 78, 103-06 (narrow focus on innocent death
row inmates may lead only to narrow procedural changes rather than abolition); Council of Europe,
Parliamentary Assembly, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, Doc.
9115, at para. 36 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Parliamentary Assembly Report], available at
http://www.assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc01/EDOC9115.htm.
[FN29]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 38-41.
[FN30]. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
[FN31]. In the last twenty-five years the death row population has grown steadily, to reach a high of
3711 in 2001. Summary of State Lists of Prisoners on Death Row, Death Row U.S.A. at 25 (Winter
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2002), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002); see
also James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2065 tbl.4 (2000).
[FN32]. New York, for example, reinstituted the death penalty in 1995. See Kirchmeier, supra note 23,
at 20.
[FN33]. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1959-82 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § §
3591-99 (1994)); see generally Rory K. Little, Foreword: The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some
Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347 (1999).
[FN34]. See, e.g., Cecile S. Holmes, Christianity’s Ties to Penal System Explored, The Times-Picayune,
July 7, 2001, at 14. McVeigh’s execution was followed closely by that of Juan Garza, a convicted drug
trafficker.
[FN35]. As of January 1, 2002, 24 individuals were on federal death row, as compared to 3680 in the
states. See Summary of State Lists of Prisoners on Death Row, supra note 31.
[FN36]. See id.
[FN37]. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Mexican Killer Is Refused Clemency by Oklahoma, N.Y. Times,
July 21, 2001, at A8 (as of July 2001, ninety-seven non- U.S. citizens were on death row in seventeen
states; they hailed from thirty- four different countries, though approximately half of them were
Mexican citizens).
[FN38]. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 753, 767 (2000).
[FN39]. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
[FN40]. Id., art.2(1).
[FN41]. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force March 1, 1985), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/couneurproto6.htm [hereinafter Protocol No. 6].
[FN42]. Id., art. 2. See also Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty, art. 2 (adopted June 8, 1990), at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/oasdeath.htm.
[FN43]. Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 7, at 21.
[FN44]. Leena Kurki, International Standards for Sentencing and Punishment, in Sentencing and
Sanctions in Western Countries 331, 347 (Michael Tonry & Richard S. Frase eds., 2001). Membership
in the Council of Europe is a prerequisite for admission to the European Union.
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[FN45]. The Protocol is in effect in thirty-five Council of Europe member- states, and has been signed
by four others. Id. Only Turkey has not yet taken any action on it. Chris Patten, Intervention at the
Council of Europe, June 21, 2001, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/pattern/sp01_300.htm.
[FN46]. For a detailed listing of the legal situation in all Council of Europe member states and observer
states, see Council of Europe, Death Is Not Justice: The Council of Europe and the Death Penalty 26-42
(Oct. 2001), at http://www.humanrights.coe.int/dp/pdfs/deathpen.pdf.
[FN47]. See, e.g., Kurd Leader Wins Appeal Right, United Press Int’l, Dec. 15, 2000.
[FN48]. See, e.g., Ayla Ganioglu, Poll Expectation Obstructs Lifting of Death Penalty, Turkish Daily
News (Apr. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/0_4_01_02/dom.htm#d5; Ilana Navaro, Breaking
Turkish Taboos, The Jerusalem Report, May 8, 2000, at 34.
Compare Turkey’s reaction to European pressure with the response of the state of Arizona in the
LaGrand case, infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text.
[FN49]. Turkey has long aspired to membership in the European Union, and has been warned that an
execution would put these plans on hold indefinitely. The European Union has been accused of
imposing its vision of human rights on countries where it can exert power but does not do so in
situations where its economic strength is insufficient. Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, Human Rights in the
European Union: Internal Versus External Objectives, 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 363, 378 (2001).
See also David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally (2001) (draft on
file with the author) (outlining the anti- death penalty pressure Western European countries have exerted
on Eastern European countries planning to join the Council of Europe, and ultimately the European
Union).
[FN50]. Council of Europe, Ministers’ Deputies, Decisions CM/Del/Dec(2002)784, 784th meeting (Feb.
21, 2002), at 4.5 & App. 9, at http://cm.coe.int/stat/E/Decisions/2002/784/d04_5. Protocol No. 13 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of
the death penalty in all circumstances, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/187.htm.
The Protocol was opened for ratification on May 3, 2002. It does not allow any derogations or
reservations.
[FN51]. Despite a moratorium on death sentences, Russia has still not fulfilled its obligation toward the
Council of Europe of banning the death penalty altogether and signing the Sixth Protocol. Russian
Parliament Will Refuse to Abolish Death Penalty: Deputy, Agence France Press, Feb. 8, 2002.
[FN52]. Toni M. Fine, Moratorium 2000: An International Dialogue Toward a Ban on Capital
Punishment, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 421, 427-28 (1999) (“The Italian government has been the
driving force behind the recent international abolitionist movement”).
[FN53]. European diplomatic efforts have created difficulties for U.S. diplomats in their conduct of
foreign policy. See Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001)
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(No. 00-8727), available at 2001 WL 648607 [hereinafter Diplomats’ Brief]; infra notes 142- 44 and
accompanying text.
In addition to legal and diplomatic measures, European countries have also suggested an economic
boycott of goods manufactured in states that continue to employ capital punishment. Fine, supra note
52, at 428; Peter O. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists, 79(6) Foreign Affairs 9, 14 (Nov./Dec. 2000). For a
discussion of the increasing importance of subnational governments within the international human
rights regime, see Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 567,
583-87 (1997) [hereinafter The States and International Human Rights].
[FN54]. See, e.g., EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Excerpts from the Memorandum by the European
Union at the 54th United Nations General Assembly, at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/54thUNexcrpt.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002) (detailing
various EU interventions in death cases around the globe). The European Union has developed
guidelines how to approach the imposition of the death penalty in third countries. The Council of the
European Union, Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, June 3, 1998,
at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Guidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002)
[hereinafter EU Guidelines].
[FN55]. The Death Penalty: Europe v. America, World View Commentary No. 87, Nov. 16, 2000, at
http://www.law.nwu.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/hrcomments/2000/Nov16_00.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
[FN56]. For some examples of this strategy, see Patten, supra note 45.
[FN57]. See Kurki, supra note 44, at 349. The time frame during which a woman should not be
executed after giving birth varies dramatically. A number of countries seem to extend it to two years-the length of time the World Health Organization suggests that women nurse their children.
[FN58]. While the intentional and unjustified taking of human life is generally considered the most
serious offense, there is disagreement as to what other types of crimes might fit into this category. In
addition, a substantial number of states violate this prohibition by imposing the death penalty for drug
trafficking or adultery. See, e.g., Kurki, supra note 44, at 348.
[FN59]. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (imposition of death penalty on people
who were under sixteen when crime was committed violates Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments), with
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (imposition of capital punishment on sixteen- and seventeenyear-old offenders constitutionally permissible).
Eighty-three of eighty-nine retentionist countries respect this prohibition. Among the remaining six,
during the 1990s the United States executed the largest number of individuals who committed offenses
while under eighteen. Kurki, supra note 44, at 348.
[FN60]. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). In oral argument, the Court raised the question whether the Europeans’
position on the execution of the mentally retarded should be relevant in the Court’s decision making.
Oral Arguments, Atkins v. Virginia, 2002 WL 341765 (U.S. 2002). For other death cases in which the
Supreme Court looked outside U.S. borders to determine international norms, see, e.g., Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389-90 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830- 31 (1988).
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[FN61]. See, e.g., Letter of the European Union, supra note 4; EU Guidelines, supra note 54.
[FN62]. The decision, however, indicates that the Europeans may not have to expect much support from
the Supreme Court in their efforts to protect juveniles from the imposition of the death penalty. See
Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.18.
[FN63]. Id. at 2249 n.21. In his dissenting opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist considers the Court’s
reference to international opinion and foreign laws flawed as he “fail[s] to see... how the views of other
countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate
determination.” Id. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
[FN64]. European Parliament Resolution on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States, B50341, 0354, 0359, 0370 and 0376/00 (Apr. 13, 2000), at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/epres041300.htm.
[FN65]. Council of Europe, Abolition of the Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States,
Resolution 1253 (2001), at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta01/eres1253.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2002); see also Parliamentary Assembly Report, supra note 28. US Warned on Death
Penalty, Fin. Times, June 27, 2001, at 1; Council of Europe to Urge Japan, U.S. to Stop Death Penalty,
Japan Econ. Newswire, June 25, 2001.
[FN66]. 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Art. 7.
[FN67]. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01, S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). This reservation was taken to
prevent Article 7 from being interpreted as outlawing the death penalty or declaring the circumstances
surrounding capital punishment to be a violation of international law. This so-called Soering reservation
refers to the decision by the European Court of Human Rights, which interpreted the identical provision
in the European Convention on Human Rights to be violated by the so-called “death row phenomenon.”
See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. See S. Exec. Rpt. No. 102-23 at 12 (1992); William A.
Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United
States Still a Party?, 21 Brook. J. Int’l L. 277, 282 (1995) [hereinafter Invalid Reservations].
The United States also entered a reservation to Article 6, in which it reserved the right to execute those
who commit crimes while below the age of eighteen.
[FN68]. Kurki, supra note 44, at 335; Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 67, at 310, 315 (Human
Rights Committee held US reservations under articles 6 and 7 invalid); EU Demarche on the Death
Penalty, Feb. 25, 2000, at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Demarche.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2002).
[FN69]. Schabas, Invalid Reservations, supra note 67, at 325 n.246.
[FN70]. European Parliament Resolution on the Death Penalty in the United States, B5-0613, 0619,
0624, 0631 and 0638/2000 at P 5 (June 7, 2000), at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/EPRes070600.htm.
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[FN71]. See, e.g., U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session, Resolution on the Death Penalty,
Sponsored by the European Union, Apr. 27, 2000, E/CN.4/RES/2000/65 at
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/UN56Res2000.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
Various sub-groups within the United Nations have criticized the United States for its imposition of the
death penalty. See, e.g., Kurki, supra note 44, at 349 (discussing critique of U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions of U.S. use of death penalty against juvenile
offenders). An exhaustive discussion of non-European criticism of the death penalty, including that
occurring in international fora, is beyond the scope of this paper.
[FN72]. Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Sixth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 95 Am. J.
Int’l L. 213, 214 (2001); see also EU Policy on the Death Penalty, Excerpts from a Statement Delivered
to the European Parliament by EU External Relations Commissioner the Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten,
Feb. 16, 2000, at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Patten.htm (explaining why EU froze
its death penalty resolution introduced at the General Assembly).
[FN73]. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests--Capital
Punishment and Torture, 23 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1369, 1377-78 (2000). The United States has opposed
the text every year by relying on arguments of national self-determination. Dennis, supra note 72, at
214. See also Radelet, supra note 10, at 847.
[FN74]. Question of the Death Penalty, Res. 1999/61, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, 56th Session,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61.
[FN75]. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 13, at 598.
[FN76]. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 57, 95 (1999); Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 Am.
J. Int’l L. 302, 309 (1999).
[FN77]. While domestic courts in Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia abolished capital sanctions
during the 1990s, the national courts of Rwanda have assessed the death penalty in a number of cases
arising from the Hutu massacres in the early 1990s. This discrepancy in sentences has caused serious
concern since the goal of the international tribunal has been to try the most serious offenders. Schabas,
War Crimes, supra note 13, at 763 (citing statement of Rwanda’s representative before the Security
Council).
[FN78]. The Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court was adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on
July 17, 1998. U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) art. 77.
[FN79]. See, e.g., id. at art. 77(1)(b).
[FN80]. Despite its defense of the death penalty at home, the United States has not crusaded for its
greater adoption abroad. This contrasts with its attempts to export other features of the U.S. criminal
justice system, such as the jury.
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[FN81]. Schabas, War Crimes, supra note 13, 770 (recounting the debates surrounding the punishment
provisions in the statute for the International Criminal Court and evaluating the position of the United
States).
[FN82]. No. 161, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1989).
[FN83]. Federal courts have rejected similar arguments on the death-row phenomenon. See, e.g., Ceja
v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. 1998); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996). But see
Gomez v. Ruiz, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995)
(Stevens, J.) (memorandum on denial of certiorari).
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council--the highest Commonwealth Court-- adopted the
argument of the Soering court in Pratt v. Attorney-General for Jamaica, [1993] 4 All E.R. 769 P.C., 2
A.C.1, P.C.
Even though two regional tribunals have accepted this argument, it has been criticized frequently. The
defendant can vindicate his rights through the appellate process. If he succeeds in preventing an
execution for a sufficiently long period of time while exhausting all legal avenues, under Soering that
delay prevents his execution because of the conditions on death row. For a discussion of the issue of
delay in a developed criminal justice system, see Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (concurring in
denial of certiorari, Thomas, J.; dissenting from denial of certiorari, Breyer, J.).
[FN84]. Kurki, supra note 44, at 351. Canada also no longer permits extraditions without such
assurances. Minister of Justice v. Burns, No. 26129, 2001 S.C.C. 7, 2001 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 9 (Can.,
Feb. 15, 2001).
In the Soering case, the state of Virginia promised not to seek the death penalty in exchange for
extradition. Soering was convicted and sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment. See Soering v.
Deeds, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 15443 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1074
(2001).
[FN85]. Kurki, supra note 44, at 351. For a discussion of the relevant Italian extradition case, see
Nanda, supra note 73, at 1393-94; Amnesty International, United States of America: No return to
execution--the US death penalty as a barrier to extradition, Nov. 29, 2001, 5-6 at
http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/AMR511712001ENGLISH/$File/AMR5117101.pdf
The term “retentionist” applies to countries that “retain” the death penalty.
[FN86]. See, e.g., Pratt, [1993] 4 All E.R. 769 P.C.
[FN87]. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[A]
reasoned answer to the ‘delay’ question could help to ease the practical anomaly created when foreign
courts refuse to extradite capital defendants to America for fear of undue delay in execution.”).
[FN88]. Domestic European courts have refused extradition to the United States and other retentionist
countries without assurances that the prosecution would not seek the death penalty. Nanda, supra note
73, at 1391-94.

- 20 -

A number of the individuals tried for the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were
extradited from European countries, in exchange for assurances that they would not receive the death
penalty. Jon Sawyer, Ashcroft Bucks Trend in Seeking Death Penalty, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 31,
2002, at B6; Amnesty International, supra note 85, at 14.
In a recent decision, the highest Mexican court announced a constitutional ruling that will prevent the
Mexican government from extraditing individuals who are threatened with a sentence of more than forty
years. Mexico considers forty-year sentences the maximum allowable so as not to render punishment
cruel and inhumane. Mexico Supreme Court Stays U.S. Extradition Request Due to Life Imprisonment
Penalty, 18(3) Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. (Mar. 2002).
[FN89]. Sam Dillon, Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 2001, at A1. The
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